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The literature on conflict and terrorism has paid little attention to the economic costs of terrorism for
the perpetrators. This paper aims to fill that gap by examining the economic costs of committing suicide
terror attacks. Using data covering the universe of Palestinian suicide terrorists during the second Palestinian
uprising, combined with data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, we identify and quantify the
impact of a successful attack on unemployment and wages. We find robust evidence that terror attacks
have important economic costs. The results suggest that a successful attack causes an increase of 5.3
percent in unemployment, increases the likelihood that the district’s average wages fall in the quarter
following an attack by more than 20 percent, and reduces the number of Palestinians working in Israel
by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Importantly, these effects are persistent and last for at least six
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1. Introduction 
One of the main goals of terrorism is to impose economic, psychological, sociological and 
political costs on the targeted society in order to coerce its government into granting political and 
territorial concessions. Although the success of terrorists in achieving this goal is still being 
debated (Gould and Klor, 2009), there is a growing body of empirical work showing that terror 
campaigns impose important economic costs on the targeted societies. For example, the seminal 
work of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) shows that per capita GDP in the Basque Country is 
about  10  percentage  points  lower  than  it  could  have  been  in  the  absence  of  terrorism,  as  a 
consequence of the outbreak of the conflict in this region in 1960.
1 Likewise, Eckstein and 
Tsiddon (2004) and Berrebi and Klor (2009) find that the second Palestinian uprising had an 
effect of a similar magnitude on the Israeli economy. The effects of terrorism are magnified in 
small economies like the Basque Country, Israel and Greece (Sandler and Enders, 2008; Krueger 
2007). However, they are important in other countries as well, particularly those in the process of 
development (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009).
2 
Most of the literature on the economic consequences of terrorism focuses on the economy of 
the targeted country. However, terrorism may have also unintended economic consequences on 
                                                 
1  Mickolus  et  al.  (1989)  showed  that  ETA  especially  targeted  hotels  and  resorts  to  cause  a 
decline in incoming tourism and hurt the overall Spanish economy. See also Enders and Sandler 
(1991), who are the first to compute the economic cost of terrorism. 
2 The studies cited above are but just a very small sample of the existent evidence on the effects 
of terrorism on economic outcomes in a given country. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) calculate 
the effects of terrorism on the entire world economy. See Enders and Sandler (2006) for a more 
comprehensive discussion of the related literature.   4 
the economy of the society harboring the perpetrators of terror attacks. This is the focus of our 
study.  
Our analysis identifies and quantifies the effect of harboring terrorists on the local economy. 
In  particular,  we  focus  on  the  Palestinian  economy  and  assess  the  impact  of  successful 
Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli targets on Palestinian unemployment, wages and access 
of Palestinian workers to the more lucrative Israeli labor market. Our results show that successful 
attacks have important economic consequences for the suicide terrorist’s district of origin. In 
particular, a successful attack causes an immediate increase of 5.3 percent in the unemployment 
rate of an average Palestinian district (relative to the average unemployment rate), and causes an 
increase of more than 20 percent in the likelihood that the district’s average wage falls in the 
quarter  following  an  attack.  Finally,  a  successful  attack  reduces  the  number  of  Palestinians 
working in Israel by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Importantly, these economic effects persist 
for at least two quarters after the attack. 
By measuring the economic costs of terrorism to the harboring society, our study contributes 
to the literature on the economic costs of conflict. There are two main challenges in identifying 
the causal effect of terrorism on the harboring society. First, in a large number of conflicts 
plagued by terrorism, perpetrators and targeted population live side by side, making it difficult to 
obtain the appropriate data that would allow researchers to disentangle the effect of terrorism on 
the perpetrators. This is certainly the case in conflicts that attracted a lot of the researchers’ 
attention, like the ones in the Basque Country, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Second, even for those conflicts where the appropriate data are available, solid empirical 
evidence has yet to be produced. The lack of evidence based on these conflicts is perhaps due to 
the difficulty involved in identifying the causal effect of terror on economic outcomes. Simply   5 
put, an extant correlation between terrorism and economic conditions does not necessarily imply 
that terrorism is costly. Rather, it may be that bad economic conditions are conducive to the 
launch of a terror campaign.
3 Alternatively, other factors, like political institutions and religious 
beliefs, may simultaneously affect economic conditions and the severity of terror (Abadie, 2006; 
Krueger and Laitin 2008). 
Our analysis overcomes these difficulties by relying on a detailed data set of suicide terror 
attacks and local economic conditions together with a unique empirical strategy. The available 
data  set  covers  the  universe  of  suicide  Palestinian  terrorists  during  the  second  Palestinian 
uprising, combined with quarterly data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey on districts’ 
economic and demographic characteristics, and Israeli security measures (curfews and Israeli-
induced  Palestinian  fatalities).  Our  empirical  strategy  exploits  the  inherit  randomness  in  the 
success or failure of suicide terror attacks as a source of exogenous variation to investigate the 
effects of terrorism on the perpetrators economic conditions.
4 We do so by considering only 
attacks  that  were  actually  initiated  (i.e.,  in  which  the  terrorist  was  dispatched),  and  use  the 
exogenous  variation  in  the  outcomes  of  these  attacks  as  our  source  of  identification.  We 
differentiate  between  two  main  outcomes:  a  successfully  completed  attack  (treatment)  and 
                                                 
3 There is a large literature that investigates whether or not economic conditions cause terrorism. 
See Enders and Sandler (2006) and Krueger (2007) for recent comprehensive surveys. 
4 Jones and Olken (2005, 2009) use a similar empirical strategy based on the random survival of 
country leaders. Jones and Olken (2005) examine the effect of a leader’s death on a country’s 
economic performance. More related to our study, Jones and Olken (2009) focus on the effect of 
the successful assassination of a country’s leader on that country political institutions and the 
likelihood of war.    6 
attacks in which the terrorist was “caught” by the Israeli Security Agency (control).
5 These are 
all the relevant cases where the success or failure of the attempted suicide attack was most likely 
not  determined  by  pre-existing  economic  conditions.  Thus,  our  identification  relies  on  the 
assumption that, even if the initiation of an attack is endogenously determined by economic 
conditions, conditional on launching an attack, those conditions do not directly affect the success 
or failure of the operation.
6  
In addition, our econometric strategy can rule out alternative explanations to the observed 
economic fluctuations. First, by focusing on one particular conflict, our analysis is not affected 
by the concerns associated with studies based on cross-countries comparisons. Second, we do not 
focus  on  levels,  but  rather  changes  of  all  variables  used  in  the  analysis,  thus  effectively 
controlling for districts’ fixed characteristics that may jointly affect economic conditions and the 
occurrence  of  suicide  attacks.  We  also  control  for  changes  in  districts’  demographic 
characteristics  so  that  our  results  are  not  affected  by  temporary  migration  of  part  of  the 
population in the aftermath of a terror attack. Moreover, these economic effects are obtained 
after controlling for the economic impact of local counter-terrorism measures imposed by the 
                                                 
5 We provide a formal definition of a “caught” suicide terrorist while describing the available 
data. Basically, a terrorist is classified as caught by the ISA if the terrorist failed to complete the 
attack as planned because he or she was intercepted by the security services before reaching the 
intended target. 
6 Economic conditions can indirectly affect the mission’s success. For example, Benmelech and 
Berrebi (2007) show that more educated and older suicide terrorists are less likely to fail or to be 
caught.   7 
Israeli security forces in the aftermath of an attack.
7 Therefore, we believe that our analysis 
provides reliable estimates on the economic costs of harboring terrorism. 
The  results,  therefore,  imply  that  a  successful  suicide  attack  has  significant  economic 
consequences to the perpetrating society. These economic costs could be due to a number of 
mechanisms. Terror attacks may have economic consequences due to security measures (which 
we may not be fully capturing with the available measures) that prevent local residents from 
continuing to work regularly. It is also possible that even if local workers are not prevented from 
reaching their place of work, employers in Israel may be reluctant to hire workers from a district 
that launched an attack. Moreover, other researchers have argued that successful attacks may 
cause the radicalization of the local population (Jaeger et al. 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Dickson, 2007). The radicalization of the population, in turn, brings about self-deprivation and 
the  de-prioritization  of  economic  achievement,  which  translate  into  lacking  economic 
performances (Hillman, 2007; Berman, 2000). 
 
2. Data  
2.1 Suicide Attacks 
Our  data  set  contains  detailed  information  on  all  suicide  attacks  by  Palestinians  against 
Israeli  targets  in  Israel,  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  between  September  2000  and 
December 2006. 
This data set is an updated version of the data set constructed by Benmelech and Berrebi 
(2007) from reports of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). The Israeli Security Agency reports for 
                                                 
7 Note that none of the available proxies for counter-terrorism measures reflects a particularly 
targeted policy against the suicide terrorist or his family. Rather, they reflect the use of measures 
that affect the overall population in the district of origin of the suicide terrorist.   8 
that period cover 159 suicide attacks carried out by 176 suicide terrorists in Israel, the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. According to ISA, there were about 30,000 Palestinian attacks against Israeli 
citizens and residents between September 2000 and December 2006. These attacks caused over 
1,000 Israelis fatalities. While suicide attacks account for only 0.5 percent of the total number of 
attacks, the number of fatalities in suicide attacks represents more than half the number of all 
Israelis killed in terror attacks during this period.
8   
To construct our data set, we exclude from ISA’s reports suicide attacks that were launched 
by non-Palestinians or in which we could not identify the target or the perpetrator’s district of 
origin. We also exclude attack plots where the terrorists were apprehended at the preparation 
stages since we cannot be certain that the plot necessarily would have taken the form of a suicide 
attack. As a consequence, after excluding the cases above, our data set includes 143 suicide 
attacks  carried  out  by  157  suicide  terrorists.  This  sample  represents  90  percent  of  the  total 
number of suicide attacks between September 2000 and December 2006, and is the universe of 
Palestinian  suicide  attacks  that  caused  at  least  one  Israeli  civilian  fatality.  These  attacks 
combined resulted in 597 Israeli fatalities with over 4,040 citizens injured.  
Not  all  suicide  terrorists  during  the  period  at  issue  successfully  reached  their  target  and 
completed their mission. In fact, a large number of suicide terrorists in our data set failed in their 
missions and were caught or intercepted by security forces or civilians during the attack. All 
these terrorists are clearly identified in the ISA reports. Following these reports, we classify 
                                                 
8 In principle, we would have liked to extend our analysis to all terror attacks. We cannot include 
non-suicide  attacks  in  our  sample  for  two  reasons.  First,  we  do  not  have  information  on 
unsuccessful non-suicide attacks, which in the overwhelming majority of cases were conducted 
by snipers firing at Israeli targets. Second, even in the cases of successful non-suicide attacks, we 
do not have information on the perpetrator of the attack, nor on his or her district of residence.    9 
suicide terrorists as “stopped” or “caught” if they: i) failed to detonate their explosive devices, ii) 
looked suspicious and were apprehended or killed by civilians, policemen or soldiers, before 
they were able to activate their explosives, iii) panicked and blew themselves up before they 
reached the target or died during capture, or iv) changed their minds and surrendered to the 
authorities. Out of the 157 suicide terrorists in our sample, there are 39 failed suicide terrorists: 
12 were caught alive and 27 were killed. 
The data displays clear differences in lethality between successful suicide terrorist and those 
that were caught. Whereas successfully completed attacks result on average in about 5 fatalities 
with  33  individuals  injured  during  the  attack,  unsuccessful  attacks  cause  on  average  0.28 
fatalities with 5.23 individuals injured during the attack attempt.
9 
Although there is an obvious correlation between the level of fatalities and whether or not the 
suicide terrorist was caught, the correlation is not perfect. That is, some “stopped attacks” end-up 
killing people, while some “successful attackers” do not cause any casualties. For example, on 
May  19,  2002  the  suicide  terrorist  Osama  ‘Adel  Ahmad  Bushkar,  a  resident  of  the  ‘Askar 
refugee camp near Nablus, was sent by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist-operative 
infrastructure in Nablus on a suicide mission to be executed in Israeli territory.
10 The attack 
                                                 
9 Excluded from these counts are the perpetrators themselves. 
10 In actuality, the attack was carried jointly by the PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP). According to the ISA report regarding this attack, the PIJ operatives behind 
the attack were in constant communication with the PFLP detainees in Jericho via telephone and 
courier and updated them regularly about the preparations for the attack. In addition, the driver, 
‘Adel Mahmoud Juma’, a resident of Taybeh, and another escort, Daa’ Ziyad Jamil Jayusi, a 
resident of Tulkarm and student at Al-Najah University, both of whom accompanied Osama 
   10 
intended to target one of the busiest and most crowded spots within the market of the Israeli 
coastal city of Netanya. In preparation for the attack, the suicide terrorist obtained IDF uniforms, 
which he wore as a disguise in the day of the attack in an attempt to inconspicuously access the 
crowded market. Despite his disguise as an IDF soldier (or maybe because of it) the terrorist 
aroused the suspicions of a local security patrol, which then approached him for questioning. 
Realizing that his cover was compromised, the suicide terrorist blew himself up immediately, 
and thus did not reach the initially intended target. In the process, the suicide terrorist managed 
to kill three civilians and injure sixty others. Given that the terrorist was not able to reach the 
intended target, we classify the attack as “stopped by Israeli security,” even though the suicide 
terrorist blew himself up and managed to kill Israeli civilians.  
There are opposite cases in our data as well. Namely, that a successful, undetected, and fully 
completed  attack  does  not  cause  any  casualties  beyond  the  death  of  the  perpetrators.  For 
example, on May 25, 2001 the suicide terrorist Hussein Hassan Abu Nasr, a resident of the 
Jabaliya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip and a student at the Islamic University, drove a 
tanker that contained three containers of bottled gas in the cabin and 48 kg (about 106 lbs) of 
homemade  explosives  near  the  Nezarim  junction  in  the  Gaza  Strip.
11  The  tanker  blew  up, 
according to plan and on location, with the suicide bomber on the driver’s seat. This attack is 
coded as successful in our data since it was fully completed and undetected, despite the fact that 
the  attacker  failed  to  inflict  any  Israeli  fatalities.  While  illustrative,  these  two  examples  are 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘Adel Ahmad Bushkar to the attack location, were affiliated with the PFLP. The PFLP ultimately 
took responsibility for the attack. 
11 Salah Shahadeh, one of Hamas’ senior leaders in the Gaza Strip and a founder of Hamas’ 
terrorist-operative wing, planned this attack.   11 
exceptional. As already stated, the overwhelming majority of successful attacks are also the ones 
inflicting a large number of casualties, whereas attacks that are eventually stopped tend to cause 
a relatively lower number of casualties. Thus, while our main empirical specification follows 
closely  the  above  definition,  we  also  show  that  using  an  alternative  definition  based  on  the 
number of casualties caused by each of the attacks does not change any of the results of this 
paper. 
Figure 1 presents a map of Jerusalem, the ten districts of the West Bank, and the five districts 
of the Gaza Strip. The figure shows, for each district, the total number of suicide terrorists and 
the total number of suicide terrorists classified as caught.
12 The figure clearly displays the great 
variation across districts in terms of their number of suicide terrorists, even within regions. For 
example, Nablus is the most violent district in the West Bank in terms of harboring terrorists 
with 43 suicide terrorists. On the contrary, two of its neighboring districts, Salfit and Jericho, did 
not harbor any suicide terrorist during the time period at issue. A similar pattern is observed in 
the Gaza Strip, where over 20 suicide terrorists originated from Jabalya and Gaza City, but only 
5 from Khan Yunis and Rafah. Overall, during the time period at issue the five districts in the 
Gaza Strip harbored 34 suicide terrorists, while 122 suicide terrorists came from the ten districts 
in West Bank and Jerusalem (we do not know the district of origin for one suicide terrorist). 
Interestingly, despite this large difference in the total number of suicide terrorists harbored by 
each region, terrorists from both regions have a very similar success rate. Nine suicide terrorists 
                                                 
12 ISA’s assignment of a suicide terrorist to a given district is based on the terrorist’s last known 
permanent district of residence, and is not made according to the district where they were born or 
grew up.    12 
from the Gaza Strip failed in their mission (a failure rate of 0.265), compared to thirty caught 
suicide terrorists from the West Bank (a failure rate of 0.246).  
The  data  set  on  suicide  terrorists  contains  additional  information  on  suicide  and  target 
characteristics. Out of the 157 suicide terrorists ten were female, ten attacks were carried jointly 
by  two  suicide  terrorists  and  two  attacks  involved  three  suicide  terrorists.  Interestingly  the 
number of terrorists involved in an attack did not seem to alter the probability of success. On 
average, about 25 percent of the suicide attacks failed according to ISA’s reports; out of the 
twelve  attacks  perpetrated  jointly  by  two  or  three  terrorists,  three  (25%)  were  classified  as 
failed.
13 Regarding the method used for the attack, most suicide terrorists in our sample (76 of 
them) use explosive belts, while other methods such as carrying an explosive bag or using an 
explosive laden transportation vehicle (e.g. a car, a truck, a bus or a boat) are less common.
14  
 
2.2 Economic and Demographic Characteristics of Suicide Terrorists’ Districts of Origin 
The data for our three economic outcomes of interest (unemployment rate, average wage and 
percentage  of  the  district’s  population  working  in  Israel),  as  well  as  all  the  districts-level 
demographic characteristics, are obtained from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS). This 
                                                 
13 Our econometric specification uses all the available observations, including those with two or 
three suicide terrorists acting together. Given the dichotomous nature of the main explanatory 
variable, when an attack included multiple terrorists the regression analysis treats every suicide 
terrorist  as  an  independent  observation.  While  excluding  the  observations  with  two  or  three 
suicide terrorists acting together somewhat reduces the precision of the estimates, it does not 
change any of the results of this article.  
14 Our sample includes 23 suicide terrorists who used an explosive bag and 41 who used different 
explosive laden transportation vehicles. Less common methods include the use of pipes or the 
use of scuba divers. For 11 attackers the mode of operation remained unknown or unreported.   13 
survey, conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, provides quarterly information 
on a rotating representative sample of about 22,000 individuals living in East Jerusalem, the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
A clarification is in order regarding wage indicator - our proxy for average wage. Due to 
privacy concerns, the PLFS does not report the actual wage of individuals. Instead, the survey 
provides a proxy for the individuals’ income by classifying individuals without income with a 
zero, and sorting the rest of the surveyed individuals in any given quarter according to their 
income into four bins of roughly equal size. The survey assigns a value of one to the individuals 
in the first bin, two to individuals in the second bin, and a value of three and  four to individuals 
in  the  third  and  fourth  bin  respectively.  For  the  purposes  of  the  analysis,  we  compute  the 
weighted-average  wage  indicator  for  every  district-cell,  and  assign  a  value  of  one  to  wage 
indicator  growth  if  the  wage  indicator  in  the  district  is  higher  than  in  the  previous  quarter. 
Otherwise this variable receives a value of zero. 
The top panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the economic variables of interest, 
differentiating between district-quarter cells that originated a suicide attack and the rest. This 
table exhibits some extent of a patterned difference in terms of the economic indicators for cells 
that originated a suicide terrorist and the rest. Accordingly, cells that originated a suicide terrorist 
have  a  significantly  higher  unemployment  rate  and  a  significantly  lower  percent  of  their 
population employed in Israel. These cells also exhibit lower growth in their wage indicator, 
though not statistically different from that for the rest of the cells. As we have noted earlier, these 
differences  are  not  enough  to  establish  causality,  since  it  is  possible  that  bad  economic 
conditions  are  causing  suicide  attacks,  or  that  other  unobserved  districts’  characteristics  are 
responsible for the observed differences.   14 
The middle panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the demographic variables used 
as control variables. This panel shows that the two sets of cells are balanced in terms of these 
characteristics, except for a higher percent of male population in cells that originated suicide 
terrorists. 
 
2.3  Data on Security Measures (Curfews and Israeli Induced Palestinian Fatalities) 
Our  analysis  includes  proxies  for  security  measures  that  the  Israeli  security  forces  may 
impose on each district at any given time. The available measures are the number of Israeli-
induced Palestinian fatalities and the number of days with a curfew, both measured per district-
quarter cell. The data on Palestinian fatalities during the second Palestinian uprising come from 
B’tselem, an Israeli human rights organization. B’tselem’s data (considered accurate, reliable and 
comprehensive) are widely used in studies focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see, for 
example, Jaeger et al., 2008 and Benmelech et al., 2009). The data provide detailed information 
on every Palestinian fatality, including the date and location of the incident. The data on curfews 
was obtained from the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA),  the  organization  that,  among  other  responsibilities,  monitors  closures  and  curfews 
imposed on the Palestinian population. OCHA provided us with their data on total hours under 
curfew by district-month cell between May 2002 and December 2006. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents statistics related to the security measures. This table 
shows that district-quarter cells with a suicide attack are characterized by a significantly higher 
number of Palestinian fatalities and days with curfews compared to the rest of the cells. In 
particular, during the quarter where a suicide attack was launched, harboring districts suffer from 
an average of about eight additional Israeli induced fatalities and ten more days of curfew than 
district-quarter cells from which no suicide attack originates.   15 
These  differences  highlight  the  importance  of  the  counter-terrorism  controls  in  our 
regressions. As we have mentioned above, the Israeli military presence in the district in the 
aftermath of the attack is at least partially responsible for the economic consequences suffered by 
the  harboring  district.  Perhaps  more  importantly  for  identification  purposes,  counter-terror 
measures not only affect economic conditions but may also affect the outcome of an initiated 
attack. Hence, without properly controlling for counter-terrorism we would not be able to exploit 
the success or failure of an attack as a source of exogenous variation.  
 
3. Empirical Framework 
The chosen empirical specification focuses on district-quarter cells that initiated a suicide 
terror  attack,  and  assesses  whether  the  outcome  of  the  attack  causes  changes  in  economic 
conditions in the suicide terrorist’s district of origin. Formally, we estimate model (1) below, 
 
(Δ Economic Conditions)i,t = α (Outcome of Attack)i,t-1 + β (Δ Demographic Variables)i,t 
                                               + γ (Δ Security Measures)i,t + εi,                                             (1) 
 
where (Δ Economic Conditions) denotes the change in economic conditions at the district level 
between the quarter immediately after a suicide attack and the quarter immediately preceding the 
attack. We focus on three economic variables of interest in those districts from which the suicide 
terrorist originated: the district’s unemployment rate, an indicator for increases in the district’s 
income, and the percent of the district’s population employed in Israel. The (Outcome of Attack) 
is a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of one if the suicide attack was completed without 
being stopped or caught by the Israeli security services, and zero when the suicide attack failed. 
Thus, our empirical strategy relies on local average treatment effects to identify the economic 
effects of terrorism from variation in the success of attacks that were launched from specific   16 
districts in a particular quarter. Additionally, as a robustness test, we show that the results are not 
affected when we use the number of casualties from an attack as the explanatory variable of 
interest representing the attack’s level of success. 
All the specifications control for the changes, between the quarter after the attack and the 
quarter before the attack, in district’s demographic characteristics and Israeli security measures 
that  vary  across  districts  and  time.  The  demographic  characteristics  accounted  for  include 
average years of education, percentage of population living in a refugee camp, average age, 
proportion of male in the local population and proportion of married population.  In addition, we 
include  a  West-Bank  dummy  to  control  for  regional  unobservable  characteristics  that  are 
constant over time, as well as year fixed effects.
15 Finally, εi is an error term (clustered at the 
regional level) that captures non-systematic determinants of the district’s changes in economic 
conditions.  
In addition to the specification used in model (1), we estimate a similar model but looking at 
the changes in all variables between their levels two quarters after an attack and their levels the 
quarter that immediately preceded the attack.  This estimation allows us to assess the persistence 
of the effects of successful terror attacks on the economic variables of interest.  
 
4. Results 
                                                 
15 In general, the demographic characteristics of a district do not show a lot of variation between 
two  consecutive  quarters.  We  control  for  these  characteristics,  however,  to  eliminate  the 
possibility that the results are driven exclusively by the temporary migration of the population 
across districts. That is, the moderate population (which is also more active economically) may 
temporarily leave a district right in the aftermath of a suicide attack to avoid the expected Israeli 
retaliation. By controlling for demographic characteristics of the local population, our results do 
not include temporary migration as one of the costs of suicide terrorism.   17 
4.1 Main Specification 
Tables 2 to 4 depict the results of estimating model (1) for local unemployment rate (Table 
2), an indicator of wage growth (Table 3), and the percentage of the local population that works 
in Israel (Table 4). The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that a successful suicide 
terror attack causes an increase of between 0.52 to 0.66 percentage points in the unemployment 
rate of an average Palestinian district. The specification in column 3 adds to the baseline model 
the available security measures, which restrict the sample to the years 2002-2006, the only ones 
for which these variables are available. This estimation shows an effect of greater magnitude, 
equal to a 1.4 percentage points increase in unemployment. To gauge the economic magnitude of 
these coefficients, we divide them by the average unemployment rate in all Palestinian districts. 
The results of these calculations show that a successful suicide terror attack causes an increase in 
the unemployment rate of the harboring locality that is between 5.3 percent (column 2) to 14 
percent (column 3). Thus, an average locality that harbors a suicide terrorist that succeed in his 
or  her  attack,  sees  its  unemployment  rate  increasing  immediately  after  the  attack  from  9.4 
percentage points to up to almost 11 percentage points based on the estimates of column 3. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the same specifications, focusing on the growth of the districts’ 
wage indicator as the outcome of interest. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 suggests that a successful 
terror attack causes an increase of over 20 percent in the likelihood that the harboring district’s 
average  wage  decreases  in  the  quarter  following  an  attack.  Finally,  Table  4  shows  that  a 
successful attack causes a reduction in the number of Palestinians working in Israel in the order 
of 0.2 to 0.34 percentage points. When divided by the districts’ average percent of Palestinians 
working in Israel, this translates into an increase that is between 5.1 percent (column 3) to 6.67 
percent (according to column 2) relative to its mean.   18 
 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
This subsection presents two robustness tests to the main specifications in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
The first robustness test, in Table 5, shows the economic impact of suicide terror attacks using 
the  variation  in  the  number  of  casualties  as  our  main  explanatory  variable  instead  of  the 
dichotomous variation on the success of the attacks. As the table shows, the economic effects of 
suicide terrorism are statistically significant also for this alternative definition of success and 
failure of the attacks. According to the results, an additional casualty from a suicide attack is 
associated with increased district’s unemployment, a lower probability that the district’s average 
wage increases in the quarter following an attack, and a reduction in the number of Palestinian 
from  the  district  of  the  perpetrator  terrorist  working  in  Israel.  As  expected,  the  quantitative 
impact of an additional casualty is lower than the effects found in Tables 2 to 4 based on the 
dichotomous definition of success. As shown in the specification used in the even columns of the 
table, this is due mainly to a non-linear effect of casualties on the economic outcome of interest. 
Simply  put,  we  observe  an  important  economic  effect  of  a  suicide  attack  while  comparing 
successful to unsuccessful attempts to commit a suicide attack, but a negligible impact while 
comparing, for example, suicide attacks that resulted in fifty casualties (the mean number of 
casualties in suicide attacks with a positive number of fatalities) to those that caused forty-nine 
or fifty-one casualties. These effects, however, remain strongly statistically significant once the 
non linearity in the effect of casualties is accounted for by introducing a quadratic term for the 
number of casualties. 
Table 6 presents our second robustness test. This table analyzes the effect of a successful 
suicide attack on the average economic outcomes of the region outside of the harboring district.   19 
Put differently, it analyzes the effect of a successful attack on the region hosting the suicide 
terrorist, while excluding the economic conditions of the district of origin of the suicide attacker. 
This  table  thus  further  analyzes  the  possibility  that  the  observed  effects  spillover  to  other 
neighboring districts through, among other factors, the mobility of individuals across districts 
within their region of residence and counter-terror measures imposed not only at the district level 
but also the regional level.  
The results show that the effects of a successful terror attack on neighboring districts are, in 
most  cases,  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  This  lead  us  to  conclude  that  there  are  not 
spillover effects of a successful terror attack to neighboring districts due to the migration of the 
population or counterterrorism activities. Hence, the results suggest that counter-terror measures 
are selective and imposed mostly on the district of residence of the suicide terrorist. 
 
4.3 Persistence of the Effects 
The effects estimated in Tables 2 to 4 show that successful attacks have a significant and 
important immediate effect on the economic outcomes of interest. In terms of the economic costs 
of these effects, however, it is crucial to explore whether they are short-lived, or rather persist for 
a long period of time. Obviously, the longer the effects last, the more important their economic 
magnitudes. We perform an analysis of the persistence of these effects in Table 7. Basically, this 
table differentiates all the relevant variables between their levels two quarters after an attack and 
their  levels  a  quarter  immediately  preceding  the  attack.  Therefore,  if  we  do  not  find  any 
statistically  significant  relationship  between  a  successful  suicide  attack  and  the  outcome  of 
interest, we should conclude that the effects found in Tables 2 to 4 are short lived and last at   20 
most for one quarter. On the contrary, if the coefficients in Table 7 are statistically significant, 
we should conclude that the effects of a successful terror attack last at least half a year.  
As Table 7 shows, the effects uncovered in Tables 2 to 4 persist, for the most part, for at least 
two quarters. For most of the specifications, the effects of a successful suicide attack are still 
statistically significantly different from zero six months after the attack. Moreover, whereas we 
observe decays in the magnitudes of the effects on wage growth, the estimates on unemployment 
rate and percent of the population working in Israel are strikingly constant over time, and show 
even a slight increase. Hence, successful suicide attacks have long-lasting economic effects that 
persist at least for six months after the occurrence of the attack. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper estimates the economic cost of harboring terrorism. Using a comprehensive data 
set  of  suicide  terrorism  and  economic  conditions  during  the  Second  Palestinian  uprising, 
combined  with  a  unique  empirical  strategy  exploiting  exogenous  variation  in  the  success  of 
suicide attacks, we find that successful terror attacks lead to increased local unemployment, and 
lower average wage with fewer Palestinians working in Israel. These effects are not only of an 
important  economic  magnitude,  but  are  also  relatively  long-lived,  persisting  for  at  least  six 
months after the attack.  
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to uncover systematic evidence on 
the  economic  cost  of  harboring  terrorism.  As  such,  we  document  an  important  part  of  the 
terrorism  equation:  while  trying  to  inflict  real  economic  costs  on  targeted  societies,  terror 
organizations  also  cause  significant  economic  harm  to  the  population  that  they  claim  to 
represent.  These  findings  are  important  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Beyond  their  direct 
interpretation  they  highlight,  for  instance,  the  importance  of  informing  the  leaders  and  the   21 
general population of areas harboring terrorism about the extent of the associated costs. Perhaps 
this  information  would  help  to  dissuade  terror  organizations’  supporters,  and  strengthen  the 
arguments used by the more moderate voices against terror attacks. While in this study we were 
able to uncover the costs of harboring terrorism for the average population, an important next 
step  for  direct  policy  recommendations  is  to  disentangle  that  effect  across  different 
subpopulations. That is, it is crucial to better identify the characteristics of the individuals most 
harmed by harboring terrorism. These individuals should be the first ones mobilized by policy 
makers trying to create a moderate coalition against terrorism.  
Our  analysis  has  also  indirect  implications  regarding  foreign  monetary  aid  to  areas  that 
harbor terrorism. International groups and organizations often claim that the general civilian 
population  of  countries  harboring  terrorism  is  nothing  but  another  victim  of  terrorism.  This 
population, living in poor conditions, often relies on terror organizations for the provision of 
important public goods. In return, they provide safe havens, support, or at least turn a “blind eye” 
to terror activities. As the claim goes, promoting education and development in these areas will 
free the civilian population from their reliance on terror organizations and, over time, cause a 
decrease in the level of violence. Our results put into question the overall effect of foreign aid. 
While it is desirable to promote education and development of any population, foreign monetary 
aid to countries harboring terror organizations mitigates the economic costs of terrorism. As 
such,  it  dampens  the  incentives  of  the  general  civilian  population  to  mobilize  against  terror 
groups that claim to further their political grievances by means of violent methods. 
   22 
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Figure 1: Total Number of Suicide Terrorists and Suicide Terrorists Caught by District 
 All
Districts-Quarter 
Cells without Suicide 
Attacks
Districts-Quarter 
Cells with Suicide 
Attacks
- Unemployment Rate 0.098 0.094 0.112 -0.018 ***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.031)
- Wage Indicator 2.375 2.388 2.325 0.063
(0.406) (0.419) (0.350)
- Increase in Wage Indicator 0.547 0.555 0.516 0.038
(0.498) (0.498) (0.502)
- Percentage Employed in Israel 0.051 0.054 0.038 0.016 ***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.035)
- Years of Schooling 9.203 9.202 9.206 -0.004
(0.513) (0.540) (0.396)
- Refugee Camp 0.170 0.174 0.158 0.015
(0.178) (0.183) (0.158)
- West Bank 0.688 0.678 0.725 -0.047
(0.464) (0.468) (0.449)
- Age 33.633 33.619 33.689 -0.070
(0.968) (0.963) (0.992)
- Male 0.502 0.501 0.505 -0.004 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
- Married 0.572 0.572 0.571 0.0006
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029)
- Palestinian Fatalities 8.732 7.090 15.176 -8.086 ***
(14.210) (12.272) (18.828)
- Number of Days with Curfews 3.889 1.917 12.079 -10.162 ***
(12.413) (8.005) (21.228)
448 357 91
Notes: Entries in the table represent district-quarter means of the respective variable (standard deviations appear in parentheses). The number of
days with curfews is onlyl available from the second quarter of 2002. The number of observations for this variable equals 304 (there are 245 cells
without attacks and 59 cells with attacks). *** indicates difference of means statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 1









Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, fatality data from











- Suicide Terrorist Succesfully Completes the Attack 0.0066 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0140 ***
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling -0.0116 *** -0.0097
- Age -0.0050 *** -0.0018
- Married -0.1859 *** -0.2050 ***
- Male -0.1936 *** -0.1873 ***
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp 0.0562 *** -0.0431 ***
- West Bank 0.0009 -0.0013 ***
- Palestinian Fatalities -0.00001




Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is district i's difference in unemployment rate between quarters t+1 and t-1 where
suicide attack occurred in quarter t. Similar differences are used for all demographic characteristics and security related variables
included in the regressions, except for the West Bank dummy. All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors,
adjusted for clustering at the area level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically
significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
77 154
Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data























The Effect of Succesful Suicide Attacks on Local Unemployment of Harboring District
[0.0007]
(1) (2)Variable
- Suicide Terrorist Succesfully Completes the Attack -0.1799 *** -0.2163 *** -0.2410 ***
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling -0.4912 *** 0.2912 ***
- Age 0.0292 *** 0.2505 ***
- Married -4.8744 *** -3.5325 ***
- Male 13.3293 *** 5.5255
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp 0.7922 ** -2.4935 ***
- West Bank 0.1104 *** 0.0303
- Palestinian Fatalities 0.00784 ***
- Days with Curfews -0.00091
Number of Observations
Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data
from the Israeli Security Agency, fatality data from B'Tselem, and curfews data from the U.N. office for the coordination of
humanitarian affairs.
Note: The coefficients above represent marginal effects of regressions estimated via Probit. Dependent variable is an indicator of
average wage increase in district i between quarters t+1 and t-1 where suicide attack occurred in quarter t. Similar differences are
used for all demographic characteristics and security related variables included in the regressions, except for the West Bank
dummy. All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the area level, in brackets; *
indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically













The Effect of Succesful Suicide Attacks on District's Wage
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome of Suicide AttackVariable
- Suicide Terrorist Succesfully Completes the Attack -0.0020 -0.0034 *** -0.0026 ***
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling -0.0356 *** -0.0110 ***
- Age -0.0094 *** -0.0007
- Married -0.0084 -0.0004
- Male -0.0695 *** 0.0787 *
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp -0.0709 *** -0.0173
- West Bank 0.0026 *** -0.0007 ***
- Palestinian Fatalities -0.00006 *
- Days with Curfews 0.00009 ***
Number of Observations
R
2 0.238 0.422 0.347
Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data
from the Israeli Security Agency, fatality data from B'Tselem, and curfews data from the U.N. office for the coordination of
humanitarian affairs.
Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is district i's difference in percentage of population working in Israel between
quarters t+1 and t-1 where suicide attack occurred in quarter t. Similar differences are used for all demographic characteristics and
security related variables included in the regressions, except for the West Bank dummy. All regressions include year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the area level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, **













The Effect of Succesful Suicide Attacks on Percentage of District's Population Working in Israel
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome of Suicide AttackVariable
- Number of casualties from suicide terror attack (in thousands) -0.0182 0.0703 *** -0.5262 *** -8.3565 *** -0.0424 *** -0.2048 ***
- Number of casualties from suicide terror attack square (in thousands) -0.6718 *** 65.1683 *** 1.2338 ***
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling -0.0110 *** -0.0112 *** -0.4134 *** -0.4118 *** -0.0342 *** -0.0340 ***
- Age -0.0068 *** -0.0069 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0265 *** -0.0099 *** -0.0098 ***
- Married -0.2004 *** -0.2114 *** -5.0925 *** -4.7384 *** -0.0186 0.0016
- Male -0.1817 *** -0.1774 *** 13.6071 *** 14.1193 *** -0.0560 *** -0.0638 ***
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.1038 0.0781 *** -0.0974 *** -0.0974 ***
- West Bank -0.0016 *** -0.0008 0.0732 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0004 -0.0010


















































Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data from the Israeli Security Agency, fatality data from B'Tselem, and curfews data
from the U.N. office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs.
Note: Estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is district i's difference in economic outcome of interest between quarters t+1 and t-1 where suicide attack occurred in quarter t. Similar differences are used for all
demographic characteristics and security related variables included in the regressions, except for the West Bank dummy. All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering
at the area level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 5
The Effect of Number of Casualties from Suicide Attacks on District's Economic Outcomes
0.450
Unemployment Wages Population Working in Israel
[0.138]Variable
- Suicide Terrorist Succesfully Completes the Attack -0.0056 -0.0060 *** 0.0020 -0.2089 -0.3606 *** -0.0645 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0002
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling 0.0509 *** 0.0390 *** 2.7634 4.5008 -0.0610 *** -0.0115 ***
- Age -0.0282 *** -0.0101 -0.8780 ** -1.5990 ** 0.0030 0.0090 ***
- Married -0.4494 0.2017 -28.7111 *** -53.515 * -0.2226 -0.0916
- Male -0.3229 * -1.9208 * 36.9373 *** 70.957 * 0.4198 0.3724 *
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp 0.0999 -0.3614 -4.3591 *** -111.320 *** -0.1271 -0.1766 ***
- West Bank 0.0065 *** 0.0094 *** -0.6202 ** -1.9625 ** -0.0014 *** 0.0022 ***
- Palestinian Fatalities 0.00106 *** 0.19689 *** 0.00004





The Effect of Succesful Suicide Attacks on Economic Conditions of Other Districts in Same Region
Unemployment Wage Increases Work in Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome of Suicide Attack
[0.0036] [0.0017] [0.0064] [0.1993] [0.1180] [0.1908] [0.0034] [0.0018] [0.0003]
[0.0144] [0.0061] [2.8327] [4.8616] [0.0046] [0.0014]
[0.0010] [0.0158] [0.3771] [0.7013] [0.0204] [0.0003]
[0.3465] [0.1475] [10.3943] [32.49] [0.1611] [0.1000]
[0.1889] [1.0851] [3.7723] [39.09] [0.4896] [0.2050]
[0.0626] [0.3264] [0.3585] [10.86] [0.1096] [0.0205]
[0.0001] [0.0017] [0.2728] [0.9002] [0.0004] [0.0001]
Security Related Variables 
[0.0004] [0.0597] [0.00004]
[0.0014] [0.0063] [0.00004]
0.085 0.574 0.167 0.248
154 154 77 154 154 77
0.495 0.684
Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data from the Israeli SecurityAgency, fatality data from B'Tselem, and curfews
data from the U.N. office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs.
Note: PanelsAand C estimated via OLS; panel B estimated via probit. Dependent variable is the average change of economic variable of interest between quarters t+1 and t-1 for other districts in region of
origin of suicide attack that occurred in quarter t. Similar differences are used for all demographic characteristics and security related variables included in the regressions, except for the West Bank dummy.
All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the area level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at
5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
154 154 77
0.217 0.426 0.455Variable
- Suicide Terrorist Succesfully Completes the Attack 0.0136 0.0128 *** 0.0164 *** -0.1622 -0.1681 -0.0526 *** -0.0030 *** -0.0040 *** -0.0018
Districts' Demographic Characteristics
- Years of Schooling -0.0196 ** -0.0031 -0.1265 -0.2453 *** -0.0109 *** -0.0005 ***
- Age -0.0112 *** -0.0020 0.0707 0.1056 -0.0021 ** -0.0006 *
- Married -0.0811 -0.2547 *** 2.1466 *** -3.5848 * 0.1266 *** -0.0672
- Male -0.0415 -0.2165 7.5840 ** -6.2229 *** 0.1001 *** 0.0606 *
- Percentage of Population in Refugee Camp -0.1501 * -0.1827 *** 0.2427 -2.9999 *** 0.0148 0.0357
- West Bank -0.0015 0.0024 0.0371 -0.4205 *** 0.0061 *** -0.0031
- Palestinian Fatalities 0.00010 0.00831 * -0.00001





Outcome of Suicide Attack
Source: Authors' calculations using economic and demographic data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, suicide attack data from the Israeli Security Agency, fatality data from B'Tselem, and curfews
data from the U.N. office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs.
Note: PanelsAand C estimated via OLS; panel B estimated via probit. Dependent variable is change of economic variable of interest in district i's between quarters t+2 and t-1 where suicide attack occurred
in quarter t. Similar differences are used for all demographic characteristics and security related variables included in the regressions, except for the West Bank dummy. All regressions include year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the area level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically












Persistence of the Effect of Succesful Suicide Attacks on Economic Conditions
[0.0031] [0.0050]



















Unemployment Wage Increases Work in Israel
(8) (9)
[0.0012] [0.0023]
[0.0025] [0.0000]
[0.0010] [0.0003]
[0.0367] [0.0875]
[0.0290] [0.0357]
[0.0227] [0.0490]
[0.0004] [0.0033]
[0.00012]
[0.00004]
154 77
0.267 0.159